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Gilmour: Overview of Medical Malpractice Law in Canada

Overview of Medical Malpractice Law in
Canada*
Joan M. Gilmour**
INTRODUCTION

In Canada, as in the United States, there is a perception that
the country is in the throes of a malpractice "crisis" involving
both liability and insurance issues-health care providers perceive an increased exposure to or risk of legal liability for ever
larger amounts of money. However, claims data from the two
countries vary widely, in part because of procedural and doctrinal difference between the two legal systems. In order to assess
that claim of a crisis and evaluate recent developments in medical malpractice law, this article will first explore the context in
which health care is provided and the liability insurance arrangements in Canadian health care.
I.

DIFFERENCES IN CONTEXT-HEALTH CARE AND
LIABILITY COVERAGE IN CANADA

Under the Canada Health Act,' legal residents of Canada are
entitled to health care. Both the federal and provincial levels of
government fund the health care system through program costsharing.2 For the most part, health care services are paid for out
of general tax revenues, although there are also provisions for
collecting some contribution to the cost of provincial health care
plans from provincial residents. These arrangements vary from
* This article is based upon Professor Gilmour's speech delivered at the Fourth
Annual Comparative Health Law Conference, "Medical Malpractice: A Comparative
Analysis," sponsored by Loyola University Chicago School of Law Institute for
Health Law in October of 1993.
** Joan Gilmour is a Professor of Law at Osgoode Hall Law School at York
University. She received her Master of Laws and Doctor of Laws from Stanford Law
School in California, her Bachelor of Laws and Letters from the Faculty of Law at
University of Toronto, and her Bachelor of Arts from St. Michael's College at the
University of Toronto.
1. Canada Health Act of 1984, R.S.C., ch. C-6, § 3 (1985).
2. Id., §§ 5-12; Federal-Provincial Fiscal Arrangements and Established Programs
Financing Act of 1977, 1976-77 S.C., ch. 10, amended by 1980-81-82-83 S.C., ch. 94
[hereinafter Established Programs Financing Act].
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province to province.3 The health care program primarily covers hospital and medical care and diagnostic services.
The Canada Health Act establishes five criteria that provincial health insurance plans must meet: they must be comprehensive, universal, accessible, portable, and publicly administered. 4

The federal government enforces these requirements through
the use of the carrot and stick of transfer payments, which are
funds paid to the provincial governments to assist them in funding the provision of health care and education. If a province
fails to meet its obligations with respect to the type of health
care program it is supposed to make available, then its transfer
payments from the federal government can be reduced or withheld.6 Noncompliance, then, though not illegal, is costly.
In practical terms, this means that the residents of each province have access to needed medical services, and that patients do

not pay providers (physicians or hospitals) directly. The existence of provincial health insurance plans has not, however, al-

tered either the contractual basis on which health care is
3. In Ontario, for instance, there is now an employer tax levied to pay for part of
the cost of health care, which was recently extended to those who are self-employed.
See Tom Kingisepp, Self-employed in Ontario Face Payroll Tax Deadline, TORONTO
GLOBE & MAIL, Oct. 18, 1993, at B6. This tax replaces a system of modest premiums
paid by provincial residents.
4. R.S.C., ch. C-6, § 7.
5. Id., §§ 4-7. See also Established Programs Financing Act. The transfers are
made up of a combination of tax points and cash. Despite the guarantees of universality and portability, there are variations among provinces and within individual
provinces with respect to access to services and resources spent on health care. See,
e.g., Paul Barker, Medicare, Meech Lake and the FederalSpending Power, 5 CAN. J. L.
& Soc'y 111, 118-123 (1990). In R. v. S. (S.), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 254, the Supreme Court
of Canada held that variation among provinces in sentencing options for young offenders did not violate constitutional equality rights where the legislation left the provincial Attorneys-General discretion in that regard. This may suggest a similar scope
for variation among provincial health care plans. See also Finlay v. Canada (Minister
of Finance), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 1080 (conditions attached to the federal government's
contribution to provincial expenditures under a federal spending statute are not
designed to dictate the precise terms of provincial legislation, but rather to promote
legislation that achieves substantial compliance with the federal legislative
objectives).
6. The incentive to comply with the Canada Health Act may be disappearing in
the wake of federal government restraint measures that will result in the cash portion
of its transfer payments to the provinces disappearing entirely in the near future, leaving it with no way to entice compliance or punish deviation. See NATIONAL COUNCIL
OF WELFARE (CANADA), FUNDING HEALTH AND HIGHER EDUCATION: DANGER
LOOMING 19 (1991);'Reference re Canada Assistance Plan, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 526 (fed-

eral government acted constitutionally in cutting expenditures and limiting growth of
payments to financially stronger provinces by statutory amendment to the Canada
Assistance Plan).
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delivered or the method of physician remuneration. Although
there are other models of payment-for example, clinics with
salaried physicians and health service organizations where physicians are paid on a capitation basis-by far the majority of
physicians in Canada are paid by the provincial health insurance
plans on a fee-for-service basis.
There is no upper limit on the cost or amount of needed
health services that patients can receive. However, the provincial health insurance plans do not provide blanket coverage, and
as financial pressures on government health care budgets grow,
the list of uninsured services grows. There are also concerns
that with increased financial restraints, needed medical services
will not be readily available, even if they are insured. 7 In addition to insured services, there is a growing private market that
provides services not insured under the provincial system. 8 Despite these exceptions and budgetary restraints, it is still fair to
say that, as one author has noted, "[t]he contemporary understanding in Canada [is] of health care as a fundamental aspect of
public welfare accessible to every citizen [actually, legal resident] as of right."9
Funding is not the only aspect of Canada's health care system
that differs from that in the United States: liability insurance
arrangements are different as well. Some ninety percent or
more of all active civilian physicians in Canada belong to one
medical defence organization, the Canadian Medical Protective
Association (C.M.P.A.), a nonprofit entity owned and operated
by its physician-members since 1901.10 The C.M.P.A. is techni7. This has, in fact, gone beyond the point of concern to litigation. See, e.g., Sallis
v. Vancouver Gen. Hosp., No. 907316 (B.C.S.C. filed Nov. 8, 1990) (alleging that the
wait a patient endured before needed surgery was performed to replace a worn-out
artificial valve in her heart resulted in her otherwise avoidable death).
8. This would include insurance to cover prescription drugs or the extra cost of
semiprivate and private hospital accommodation. There is growing concern over private offerings of otherwise publicly funded services, such as nuclear magnetic
resonance imaging. See, e.g., Rod Mickleburgh, Ottawa Warns Alberta About Billing
Patients, TORONTO GLOBE & MAIL, Nov. 24, 1993, at A5.
9. Hester Lessard, The Construction of Health Careand the Ideology of the Private
in Canadian Constitutional Law, 2 ANNALS HEALTH L. 121, 147 (1993). Health,
though, is still related to economic status, and the health gap stubbornly persists. See,
e.g., NATIONAL COUNCIL OF WELFARE (CANADA), HEALTH, HEALTH CARE AND
MEDICARE (1990); Margaret A. Shone, Health, Poverty and the Elderly: Can the
Courts Make a Difference?, 29 ALTA. L. REV. 839 (1991).
10. LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION IN HEALTH CARE: A REPORT TO THE CONFERENCE OF DEPUTY MINISTERS OF HEALTH OF THE FEDERALIPROVINCIALITERRITORIAL REVIEW ON LIABILITY & COMPENSATION ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE app. A at
58 (1990) [hereafter PRICHARD REPORT].
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cally not an insurance company, as it does not sell insurance and
it has the discretion to refuse claims." In practice, however, it
acts like an insurer in that it fully indemnifies its members
against damages and legal costs associated with malpractice
claims, it represents members in some professional disciplinary
and other regulatory proceedings and inquests, and it provides
advice on legal issues that arise in the course of medical practice.' 2 There is no deductible and no cap on the settlements and
awards that the C.M.P.A. will pay. Hospitals have generally
shifted towards self-insurance in the past few years, and nurses
recently set up a protective society similar to that of
physicians.13
Since 1984, the C.M.P.A. has charged membership fees, which
differ by the physician's area of practice and the risk associated
with it.14 Fees now range from $1,044 (Can.) per year for pathologists and medical administrators to more than $17,000
(Can.) a year for orthopedic surgeons and neurosurgeons. 5
However, provincial medical associations and governments have
negotiated arrangements providing for a public contribution intended to reimburse physicians fully or partially for16 C.M.P.A.
dues or other malpractice insurance premiums paid.
When compared with the United States, concerns about a
malpractice crisis in Canada seem overblown. The C.M.P.A. has
a membership of more than 55,000 doctors. In 1992, 73 malpractice actions against physicians went to trial in Canada, and
48 of those were resolved in favour of the physician; in 1991,
physicians prevailed in 47 of the 61 cases that went to trial.' 7 In
1992, the amount of money paid by the C.M.P.A. for settlements
and damage awards at trial fell 9.6 percent, from $45,613,000
11. Patricia M. Danzon, The "Crisis" in Medical Malpractice: A Comparison of
Trends in the United States, Canada,the United Kingdom and Australia, 18 LAW, MED.
& HEALTH CARE 48, 55 (1990); Gerald Robertson, Reform of the Law of Medical
Liability: The Position in the Common Law Jurisdictions of Canada, in CANADIAN
COMPARATIVE LAW ASSOCIATION, CONTEMPORARY LAW 173,
12. PRICHARD REPORT, supra note 10, app. A at 58-59.

186 (1992).

13. Id., app. A at 63-64.
14. Robertson, supra note 11, at 186; Bernard H. Dickens, Implications of Health
Professionals' Legal Liability, 1 HEALTH L.J. 1, 2 (1993).
15. Matt Borsellino, Everything You Always Wanted to Know About the CMPA
But Were Afraid to Ask, MEDICAL POST, June 8, 1993, at 47.

16. Dickens, supra note 14, at 3; PRICHARD REPORT, supra note 10, app. A at 60.
17. In 1990, physicians' defences prevailed in fifty-one out of seventy-seven cases;
in 1989, thirty-two of fifty-eight claims were successfully defended at trial. CANADIAN
MEDICAL PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION, NINETY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT

[hereinafter C.M.P.A.

18 (1993)

REPORT].
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(Can.) in 1991 (an average of $193,275 (Can.) per claim) to
$41,204,000 (Can.) in 1992 (an average of $134,654 (Can.) per
claim).1 8 These reduced amounts are in part the result of an increase in the number of settlements, from 236 in 1991 to 306 in
1992.19 The change from 1991 to 1992 cannot necessarily be
taken as indicative of a trend; results vary dramatically on a
year-to-year basis because of the relatively small absolute
number of claims. Nonetheless, the perception of a "crisis"exponential increases in awards and in the success of plaintiffs at
trial-is not borne out by the claims experience. Still, it is true
that Canada has seen significant increases in the frequency and
severity of claims brought against physicians as well as in the
membership, which are in effect the "inrates paid for C.M.P.A.
'2°
surance premiums.
Several procedural and doctrinal distinctions between the Canadian and United States legal systems explain in part the difference in the medical malpractice experience in the two countries.
II.

DIFFERENCES IN PROCEDURE

Canada's legal system in general, and the tort system in particular, operates differently than that of the United States; the
procedural differences are important to understand to properly
evaluate the claims experiences of both nations.2 '

18. Id. at 31; see also Ken Pole, CMPA Settlements Down Sharply From Last Year,
Aug. 24, 1993, at 33.
19. C.M.P.A. REPORT, supra note 17, at 18.
20. PRICHARD REPORT, supra note 10, app. A at 28-31, 59. Physicians are still
much more likely to be sued for malpractice in the United States than in Canada.
Danzon, supra note 11, at 50. Danzon also suggests that, at least in 1988 when she
was writing, claim severity or average payment per claim was not so different between
the two countries, although she added that these figures may be misleading. Absent
the deterrent effect of costs sanctions in the United States, greater numbers of minor
claims may be asserted (exerting downward pressure on claim severity), while at the
same time, American awards build in contingent fee payment (exerting upward pressure on claim severity). Id. at 56. But see Theodore R. LeBlang, Medical Malpractice
and Physician Accountability: Trends in the Courts and Legislative Responses, 3 ANNALS HEALTH L. 105, 105 (1994) (citing more recent figures indicating a new round of
increases in the median verdict for malpractice claims for the period from 1987
through 1991 in the United States).
21. See, e.g., Peter C. Coyte et al., Medical Malpractice-The Canadian Experience, 324 N. ENG. J. MED. 89, 92 (1991); PRICHARD REPORT, supra note 10, app. A at
10-11.
MEDICAL POST,
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Judge as Opposed to Jury as Trier of the Case

A Canadian tort case is typically determined by a judge alone
and not by a civil jury. Although it used to be assumed almost
as a matter of course that the facts and issues in medical malpractice cases were too complex to be left to juries, this perception has now changed to the point that today a jury notice
served in a malpractice action is no longer struck out as a matter
of course if attacked. 2 Nonetheless, juries are still not widely
chosen by plaintiffs' counsel, and even less so by defendants'
counsel.
B.

Contingent Fees

The contingency fee system is not used as widely in Canada as
in the United States to determine legal fees. In fact, this system
is prohibited in Ontario except in class actions. Where available, contingency fee arrangements tend to be closely and carefully regulated and supervised, and in some instances, their
availability is tightly circumscribed.23
C. Bearing the Cost of Litigation
In Canada, which has adopted the British rule that costs follow the event, the loser in a civil lawsuit must compensate the
winner for a portion of the latter's legal costs. In contrast, in the
United States, each side generally bears its own costs. Costs do
not amount to full compensation, and the proportion of the winner's legal bill covered by an award of costs decreases over time
as legal fees continue to rise. Nonetheless, an award of costs can
add up to a very significant amount of money that an unsuccessful defendant must pay in addition to an award of damages, or
that an unsuccessful plaintiff must pay in addition to his or her
own lawyer's fees.24 The possibility of having to pay the other
22. Relative to the availability of a jury trial, in Ontario, see the Courts of Justice
Act, R.S.O., ch. C-43, § 108 (1990) and ONT. R. Civ. P. 47. See also Soldwisch v.
Toronto W. Hosp., 43 O.R.2d 449 (Div. Ct. 1993) (the practice of automatically setting aside the jury notice in a medical malpractice action is not legally supportable;
the judge must decide whether retention or discharge of the jury will better serve
justice to the litigants).
23. John D. Wilson, The Costs of Medical Malpractice Litigation in Canada: Evidence and Proposalsfor Reform, in PRICHARD REPORT, supra note 10, app. B, vol. 3,
ch. 7 at 39-46.
24. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ONTARIO, THE REPORT OF THE ONTARIO COURTS
INQUIRY (ZUBER INQUIRY) 51-52 (1987). In Ontario, see, e.g., Courts of Justice Act,
R.S.O., ch. C-43, § 131 (1990) and ONT. R. Civ. P. 49.
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side's costs can deter a party from commencing a lawsuit as well
as encourage the party to settle the action.
D.

Class Actions

While class actions are used to resolve allegations of a defective medical product in the United States, in many jurisdictions
in Canada, class actions are effectively unavailable except in
very limited circumstances. Even minor differences among
claims are sufficient to disqualify them under the provincial
rules governing such proceedings. 25 However, class actions have
recently become more widely available in Ontario through the
passage of the Class Proceedings Act, which greatly liberalized
the rules governing such proceedings. 26 Under the new legislation, it is even possible to obtain some funding to assist plaintiffs
in carrying a certified class action forward.27 The ability to join
together in an action and obtain financial assistance may ease
some access problems. Where the claim involves a manufacturer's alleged failure to warn, the physician will typically be
joined in the action either as an additional defendant or a third
party since manufacturers commonly assert that any failure to
warn was the physician's. With liberalized class action laws, increasing numbers of such claims may be expected. For example,
recently in Ontario, a class of recipients of breast implants alleging damages against McGhan Medical Corporation and Dow
Corning Inc. was certified.28
E. Awards
Awards for pain and suffering, which are a major component
of personal injury awards in the United States, are subject to a
relatively modest judicially imposed cap in Canada. In a trilogy
of decisions released fifteen years ago, the Supreme Court of
Canada capped nonpecuniary damages at $100,000 (Can.) (in
1978 dollars). The court reasoned that no amount of money
could ever truly compensate for the nonpecuniary element of
catastrophic injury although it can provide "solace," not in the
sense of sympathy, but rather through "physical arrangements
25.
26.
27.
(1992);
28.

Naken v. General Motors Can. Ltd., 144 D.L.R.3d 385 (S.C.C. 1983).
Class Proceedings Act, S.O., ch. 6 (1992).
Law Society Amendment Act (Class Proceedings Funding), S.O., ch. 7, §§ 2, 3
R.O. 771/92 (1992).
Bendall v. McGhan Medical Corp., 14 O.R.3d 734 (Gen. Div. 1993).
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to make life more endurable" above and beyond those relating
directly to the injuries.29
The absolute dollar amount that courts can award in nonpecuniary damages continues to be adjusted for inflation, such that
by the 1990s, it was approximately $220,000 (Can.). 30 The concept of a cap, however, remains firmly in place. Total amounts
awarded have also been affected by the increased sophistication
of the evidence used to establish the real costs of the injury
(such as lost income and cost of future care) and by the need to
take into account the future income tax liability on investment
income generated by the amount awarded.31
F. Discount Rates

Discount rates employed to convert foregone future income
to present value for purposes of a lump sum award seem subject
to wide variations in judicial practice in the United States; however, Ontario
and other Canadian provinces follow a standard32
ized rate.
G. Punitive Damages

Punitive or exemplary damages are very rarely granted by Canadian courts, but may constitute a significant component of
damage awards in the United States. In Canada, a distinction is
drawn between aggravated damages and punitive damages. Aggravated damages do not supplement general damages; rather,
the amount of general damages takes into account and is increased by "any aggravating features of the case. ' 33 Aggravated
damages are still meant to compensate. On the other hand, punitive damages are not compensatory; they are awarded to punish the defendant and to make an example of him or her in
order to deter others from engaging in the same or similar con29. Thornton v. School Dist. No. 57 (Prince George), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 267; Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alta. Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229; Arnold v. Teno, [1978] 2 S.C.R.
287. On the advantages and disadvantages of capping damages, see Wilson, supra
note 23, at 116-118. See also Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Economic Perspectiveson the Liability Crisis, in LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA, INSURANCE LAW 1 (1987).
30. Bernard Dickens, The Effects of Legal Liability on Physicians' Services, 41 U.
TORONTO L.J. 168, 173 n.267 (1991). See also Rea, supra note 29, at 7-8.
31. Rea, supra note 29, at 6-8.
32. On the effect of various discount rates, see id. at 5-6.
33. Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 224, 263 (per La Forest, J., Gonthier and
Cory, JJ., concurring).
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duct.34 The defendant's conduct must have been egregious in
the extreme and morally as well as legally wrong before courts
will award punitive damages.
H.

Statutes of Limitations

Limitation periods in Canada are often subject to a discovery
rule.35 Further, they will be held in abeyance for minors and
individuals who are decisionally incapable.36
I. Regional Diversity

There is a marked coherence in cases decided in the common
law jurisdictions in Canada, in part because of the role played by
the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme Court of the
United States generally does not hear appeals on matters of

purely state law, which includes most aspects of tort law, thus
creating the potential for substantial diversity of doctrine among
the states and consequent uncertainty for insurers operating in a
number of state markets. Canada does not distinguish between
state and federal courts in the same way as the United States

does. 37 The Supreme Court of Canada sits as the highest court
of appeal from each province. That does not mean that any appeal can be taken to the Supreme Court; in a civil lawsuit, leave
must still be obtained. 38 However, the Court will hear appeals

in disputes between private individuals if in its opinion the action raises issues of public importance that go beyond the particular dispute and the interests of the parties, or where the case
34. [Piunitive damages may only be awarded in respect of conduct which is of
such nature as to be deserving of punishment because of its harsh, vindictive,
reprehensible and malicious nature. I do not suggest that I have exhausted
the adjectives which could describe the conduct capable of characterizing a
punitive award, but in any case where such an award is made the conduct
must be extreme in its nature and such that by any reasonable standard it is
deserving of full condemnation and punishment.
Id. at 263-64 (citing Vorvis v. Insurance Corp. of B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085, 1107-1108
(per McIntyre, J.).
35. City of Kamloops v. Neilson, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2; Central Trust Co. v. Rafuse,
[1986] 2 S.C.R. 147.
36. Papamonopoulos v. Board of Educ. for the City of Toronto, 30 D.L.R.4th 269
(Ont. C.A. 1986); Swain v. Lake of the Woods Dist. Hosp., 9 O.R.3d 74 (C.A. 1992);
Martin v. Listowel Memorial Hosp., 9 O.R.3d 65 (C.A. 1992).
37. In Canada, the Federal Court has quite limited jurisdiction. See Federal Court
Act, R.S.C., ch. F-7, §§ 17-35, as amended by 1990 S.C., ch. 8.
38. Supreme Court Act, R.S.C., ch. S-26, §§ 35-43 (1985).
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presents issues of law or issues of mixed law and fact that are of
sufficient importance to warrant its decision.39
In the last four years, for instance, the Court handed down
decisions in cases raising a number of medical liability issues:
whether a fresh informed consent had to be obtained from a
patient who withdrew consent in the midst of a medical procedure;40 who owned and could have access to a patient's medical
records; 41 and which party bore the burden of proof, and how
could that burden be discharged in a medical malpractice case
when the expert evidence as to causation was not definitive. 42
In Canada, the Supreme Court is a real influence for uniformity
and certainty in shaping doctrine with respect to medical
liability.
J.

Damage Calculations

Courts in Canada and in the United States may employ different methods of calculating damages for personal injuries. With
respect to the issue of collateral benefits, the Supreme Court of
Canada made a first attempt to limit "double recovery" in 1990.
In Ratych v. Bloomer,43 a five-to-four decision, the Court held
that a plaintiff who continues to receive wages following an injury cannot recover lost earnings. If lost wages are provided by
gift or pursuant to an insurance contract paid for by the plaintiff
(a quid pro quo), or if the employer has a right of subrogation,
the damages for lost wages would be recovered. This decision
was an understandable response to concerns about the overall
cost of compensation, and made sense on theoretical grounds
because tort law seeks to ensure that an individual is compensated for the full amount of his or her losses-no more and no
less. However, in practice, it is often very difficult to be sure
39. Id. § 40. Examples would include the trilogy of cases capping nonpecuniary
damages. Thornton v. School Dist. No. 57 (Prince George), [1978] 2 S.C.R. 267; Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alta. Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229; Arnold v. Teno, [1978] 2 S.C.R.
287.
40. Ciarlariello v. Schachter, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 119 (if a patient withdraws consent,
the patient may reconsent to the procedure after all risks and changes are explained).
41. Mclnerney v. MacDonald, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 138 (when a patient requests medical records, a copy of the computer file must be given to the patient, even if it contains
reports from other physicians; all information on which the doctor based his or her
medical decisions should be made available to the patient).
42. Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311 (the burden is on the plaintiff to show
causation; expert evidence is not required to prove certainty). See also Laferri~re v.
Lawson, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 541 (causation in law is not the same as causation in science,
and it is established by a balancing of probabilities).
43. 69 D.L.R.4th 25 (S.C.C. 1990).
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that the plaintiff has not paid a quid pro quo for the benefit, for
example by accepting lower wages or some other less favourable
condition of employment."
Thus, Canadians may find more barriers to bringing a claim to
court, and even when they succeed, they will find they are able
to recover less than their American counterparts. There are also
a number of substantive issues that bear on the differences in
the claims experiences of the two countries as well.
III.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW IN CANADA

A.

The Duty of Care

In the common law jurisdictions of Canada, the ordinary laws
of civil liability-the law of negligence-govern compensation
for medical accidents or mishaps, although other civil wrongs
such as battery, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty
may apply. 45 In Quebec, the civil law governs. While some elements of the common law have influenced Quebec's civil law
system, and the rules of evidence are similar, the sources, methodology, and legal reasoning relied on in the civil and common
law systems are fundamentally different. 46 This section will consider the developments in the substantive law in the other nine
provinces and two territories of Canada, all of which are common law jurisdictions.
Generally, the legal principles that apply in determining liability for medical negligence in Canada are the same as those that
govern other types of negligence claims for damages for personal injury. In broad terms, there is no great difference in the
basic principles of negligence law in Canada and the United
States. The plaintiff must establish that the defendant owed him
44. Id. at 35 (Cory, J., dissenting). Since the writing of the article, the Supreme
Court retreated from this position in Cunningham v. Wheeler, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 359.
45. The applicability of recovery for battery was somewhat circumscribed by the
Supreme Court of Canada in its decision in Reibl v. Hughes, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880,
where it was determined that a failure to obtain the patient's informed consent to a
medical procedure sounded in negligence rather than battery. The latter is still available as an avenue for recovery if properly pleaded. See, e.g., Allen v. New Mount
Sinai Hosp., 28 O.R.2d 356 (H.C. 1980), rev'd 33 O.R.2d 603 (C.A. 1981) (allowing
plaintiff to amend his complaint); Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 224 (a sexual
assault of a drug addicted patient is a battery).
46. Relative to civil law developments in Quebec, see PRICHARD REPORT, supra
note 10, app. A at 17-18; Jean-Louis Baudouin, Aperfus du droit quibecois de la
responsabilit6civile midicale: Perspectives et prospectives, in id., app. B, vol. 1, ch. 2.
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or her a duty of care, that the defendant breached this duty, and
that the defendant's breach caused the plaintiff to suffer injury.4 7

The physician has a duty to exercise reasonable care in treating a patient. The plaintiff alleging medical negligence must
prove that the physician's conduct fell below the applicable standard of care, described as "that degree of care and skill which
could reasonably be expected of a normal, prudent practitioner
of the same experience and standing." 4 Courts take into account concepts such as accepted medical practice, error of
clinical judgment, and the "two schools of thought" or "respectable minority" principle in determining whether the physician
has breached the standard of care.49
Despite the fact that changes in technology and other advances have made it more difficult for physicians to meet the
standard of care (greater care and more skill is expected of the
"normal, prudent practitioner"), the standard itself has remained essentially the same over the last two decades.5 0 There
has, however, been some expansion in the group of individuals
to whom a duty of care is owed, although this expansion has not
been uniform. For instance, it has been held that where a physician is under a statutory obligation to report to the provincial
authorities any patient whom he or she considers unfit to drive,
a physician who fails to report breaches the standard of care
owed not only to the patient but also to the general public. An
individual who is injured as a result of the patient driving has an
action against the physician. 5' In provinces where physicians
have discretion as to whether or not to report a patient, courts
have not imposed liability for failure to report even when an
accident followed.52
The standard of care applicable to hospitals has developed in
a similar manner. A hospital may be liable in negligence either
47.

ELLEN

I.

PICARD, LEGAL LIABILITY OF DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS IN CAN-

150 (2d ed. 1984).
48. Crits v. Sylvester, [1956] O.R. 132, 143 (C.A.), aff'd, [1956] S.C.R. 991; see also
Robertson, supra note 11, at 175 n.8; PICARD, supra note 47, at 154.
49. Robertson, supra note 11, at 175.
50. A view shared by Robertson, id. at 175, 178, and in the United States by PAUL
ADA

25 (1991).
51. See, e.g., Spillane v. Wasserman, 13 C.C.L. T.2d 267 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div. 1993)
(non-compliant epileptic patient suffered seizure while driving and killed a cyclist;
physicians held forty percent liable for the accident for their failure to monitor the
patient's compliance appropriately, failure to recognize he was unfit to drive, and
failure to report).
52. C.M.P.A. REPORT, supra note 17, at 26-27.
C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL
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directly for breaching a duty it owes to a patient or vicariously
for the negligence of others. As with doctors, with respect to a
hospital's direct liability, the hospital's obligations to meet the
requisite standard of care have become more onerous as the
scope of the hospital's duties has widened to include, for instance, liability for defects in its system to ensure proper and
timely patient care.5 3 With respect to vicarious liability, Canadian courts have so far held the line and continued to accept the
argument that physicians (other than residents and interns) are
independent contractors rather than employees of the hospital.5
Consequently, the hospital is not vicariously liable for physician
negligence. This doctrine is outmoded, particularly since, as Ellen Picard has noted, physicians are among the professionals
who "facilitate the achievement of hospital objectives."' 5 Still,
courts have not extended hospitals' corporate responsibility, at
least not yet.
B.

Informed Consent

The law of informed consent has undergone the most significant doctrinal development in Canadian health law over the last
fifteen years. However, the effect that these changes in theory
have had on the real world, including physician behaviour and
56
judicial decisions about liability, has been considerably muted.
In Reibl v. Hughes, a seminal informed consent decision, the
Supreme Court of Canada, in determining what information a
physician must disclose to a patient to assure that consent was
informed, abandoned the traditional test of what a reasonable
physician would disclose in favor of a test of what a reasonable
person in the patient's position would want to know-that is,
the physician must disclose all material risks. 7 Factors peculiar
53. Robertson, supra note 11, at 182; Bruce Chapman, Controlling the Costs of
Medical Malpractice: An Argument for Strict Hospital Liability, in PRICHARD REPORT, supra note 10, app. B, vol. 3, ch. 8 at 4-6.
54. Yepremian v. Scarborough Gen. Hosp., 110 D.L.R.3d 513 (Ont. C.A. 1980).
Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was granted in this case, but a
settlement was reached before the appeal could be heard. Chapman, supra note 53.
55. Ellen Picard, The Liability of Hospitals in Common Law Canada,26 McGILL
L.J. 997, 1019 (1981). See also Robertson, supra note 11, at 183-84.
56. See Barry S. Wortzman, Professional Liability-Health Care Providers, in
LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA, TORTS IN THE 80s 417,423 (1983); Gerald Robertson, Informed Consent Ten Years Later: The Impact of Reibl v. Hughes, 70 CAN. B.
REV. 423 (1991) (analyzing the basis for and outcomes in judicial decisions since Reibl
v. Hughes).
57. [1980] 2 S.C.R. 880, 898-900. American jurisprudence has been very influential in this respect. For instance, Laskin, J., cited and relied on Canterbury v. Spence,
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to the patient, such as length of time until retirement or family
obligations, could affect the type of information the physician
should impart to the patient. At least to some extent, then, what
the patient must be told has to be tailor-made to that patient
and responsive to his or her circumstances.
Reibl wrought a second change in the doctrine of informed
consent, the test for causation. Unlike the subjective test for
physician disclosure, courts do not consider whether this particular patient would have undergone the treatment if properly informed. Rather, the test is whether a reasonableperson in the
patient'sposition would have declined the treatment if he or she
had been apprised of the relevant information.5 8
Although the decision in Reibl v. Hughes immediately generated much interest among lawyers and legal academic writers,
its effect on physicians has been more delayed and diluted, and
the outcomes in actual cases have changed little. Reibl was decided in 1980; a 1984 study indicated that even among surgeons
aware of the decision and its importance, most had not altered
their practices relative to disclosure of risks to patients. 9 Many
still ranked their own views of patients' best interests well ahead
of the fact that patients would probably regard the risk as relevant to their decisions to undergo treatment. 60 Evidence from a
recent study suggests that physicians are now spending more
time with patients discussing the risks and benefits of treatment,
largely because of their fear of legal liability. However, as the
author of the latter study noted, "increased quantity of interactive time does not guarantee the quality of discourse and critical
'61
information exchange.
The effect of Reibl on the outcomes in litigation has not been
striking. Most informed consent claims that go to trial do not
succeed, at least not on that basis.62 The analysis employed in
the cases follows that outlined by the Supreme Court of Canada
in Reibl. However, even where physicians failed to meet the full
464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972) in Reibl. See also Hopp v. Lepp, 112 D.L.R.3d 67
(S.C.C. 1980).
58. [1980] 2 S.C.R. at 899. Reibl was recently confirmed by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Ciarlariello v. Schachter, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 119 (the critical question remains
what the patient would want to know).
59. Gerald B. Robertson, Informed Consent in Canada: An Empirical Study, 22
OsGOODE HALL L. J. 139, 146 (1984).
60. Id. at 147, 159-160.
61. Bernard Dickens, The Effects of Legal Liability on Health Care Providers,in
PRICHARD REPORT, supra note 10, app. B., vol. 2 at 51.
62. Robertson, supra note 11, at 179.
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disclosure standard, courts have often found that the patient
would nonetheless have gone ahead with the procedure had he
or she been fully informed. The stumbling block to plaintiffs'
recovery has become an inability to prove causation-that is,
that with adequate disclosure they would not have consented. 63
C.

The Doctor-PatientRelationship

Whether plaintiffs' inability to capitalize on Reibl may be altered by changing characterizations of the doctor-patient relationship and the obligations it subsumes is a question raised
inferentially by two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions,
Mclnerney v. MacDonald64 and Norberg v. Wynrib.65 In both

cases, the judicial characterization of the doctor-patient relationship is broadened from one based solely on contract to one
giving rise to fiduciary obligations on the part of the doctor, at
least for particular purposes and in particular contexts. Whether
these changes will be extended to the doctor-patient relationship at large is unclear as yet, although in this writer's view, it is
likely that any extension of the special obligations entailed in a
fiduciary relationship will be quite limited.
Norberg and Mclnerney were released within a week of each
other, in June, 1992. The physician-patient relation was classified as fiduciary in nature by the whole Court in the first decision, McInerney,66 and by two members of the Court in an
opinion concurring as to liability in Norberg.6 7 The remaining
justices in Norberg found it unnecessary to consider whether the
relationship was fiduciary given the type of claim that was asserted (battery).68
In Mclnerney, the Court had to determine whether a patient
was entitled to inspect and obtain copies of all of her medical
records from her physician, including those that originated with
other doctors. La Forest, J., with Gonthier and Cory, JJ., concurring, held that because of the trust and confidence that the
63. Wortzman, supra note 56; Robertson, supra note 11, at 179-180. But most
recently, see Hollis v. Birch, 81 B.C.L.J.2d 1 (C.A. 1993) (defendant manufacturer
held liable for negligence in failing to warn since a reasonable person in plaintiff's
position would not have consented to the procedure had full disclosure of the risks
associated with breast implants been disclosed).
64. [1992] 2 S.C.R. 138.
65. [1992] 2 S.C.R. 224.
66. [1992] 2 S.C.R. 138, 149.
67. [1992] 2 S.C.R. 224, 271.
68. Id. at 249, 306.
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patient places in his or her physician by virtue of the very nature
of the relationship, this relationship must be considered fiduciary in character, at least for the purpose of determining the physician's obligations with respect to information received from or
about a patient in confidence in the course of their professional
relationship. 69 Even though the patient's records were not her
property in the classic sense, the Court was prepared to hold
that the information was still fundamentally his or her own because the patient has a "trust-like" beneficial interest in the information in the physician's possession. Thus, the physician had
a fiduciary duty to provide the patient access to those records,
subject to very limited exceptions when disclosure would not be
in the patient's best interests or might harm third parties.70 At
the same time, the Court expressed some caution about applying a fiduciary analysis to the physician-patient relationship in
general. Noting that even though the relationship was fiduciary
in this context, the Court was not establishing a fixed set of rules
and principles applicable in all circumstances or to all of the obligations that arise out of a relationship. 71 Thus, the relationship
can be considered fiduciary for some purposes and not for
others.72 The Court shed no further light on the parameters of
the physician's fiduciary obligation or the circumstances in
which it might apply.
One week after Mclnerney, the Court released its decision in
Norberg v. Wynrib, a civil action for battery. The patient sought
damages for injuries she suffered as a result of a sex-for-drugs
arrangement with her doctor. She was addicted to painkillers
and tranquilizers, and the doctor prescribed them for her in return for sexual contact. The Court was unanimous in holding
that the patient was entitled to recover damages, although each
of the Court's three opinions based the plaintiff's right on different grounds.
La Forest, J., with Gonthier and Cory, JJ., concurring, focused
on the presence or absence of consent, as consent is a defence to
battery. Because of the marked inequality of power between
the parties and the plaintiff's dependence on her doctor, which
he exploited, La Forest, J., found that the plaintiff's consent to
the arrangement was legally ineffective. 73 The analysis bor69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

[1992] 2 S.C.R. 138, 149-50, 152.
Id. at 150-51, 158.
Id. at 149.
Id.
[1992] 2 S.C.R. 224, 250.
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rowed heavily from the doctrine of unconscionability used to address the issue of voluntariness in contract law. Since a fiduciary
or confidential relationship was not necessary to support a claim
based on inequality of bargaining power, La Forest, J., chose to
express no opinion on this point, although he noted that "such a
'74
relationship may be present.
Sopinka, J., with Stevenson, J., concurring, held that the physician breached the contractual duty he owed his patient to ensure that her addiction was properly treated. With respect to
the existence of a fiduciary duty, Sopinka, J., held that while
certain obligations that arise from a doctor-patient relationship
are fiduciary, others are contractual or based on the
"neighbourhood principle" that underlies the law of negligence,
adding that "[f]iduciary duties should not be superimposed on
these common law duties simply to improve the nature or extent
75
of the remedy.
However, McLachlin, J., with L'Heureux-Dub6, J., concurring, based her decision firmly on the fiduciary nature of the
physician-patient relationship. She contrasted the foundation
and ambit of contract and tort law with those of the law of fiduciary obligations. Contract and tort law assumes that the actors
are independent and equal and are concerned primarily with
their own self-interest; the law balances the need to enforce obligations with the need to preserve the parties' freedom. The
essence of a fiduciary relation is the inverse of self-interest: one
party exercises power on behalf of another and pledges to act in
the interests of the other.76 Vulnerability on the part of one
party, an assumption of power by the fiduciary that would normally reside with the vulnerable party, and an undertaking by
the fiduciary to exercise that power for the vulnerable party's
benefit are necessary conditions for the existence of a fiduciary
relationship. 77 The physician-patient relationship exhibits all of
these hallmarks. Consequently, says McLachlin, if the physician
"breaks that pledge" by using "the power the patient cedes to
him exclusively for her benefit ...he is liable. ' 78 Although contract and tort law generally provides the appropriate analytical
tools where the parties are on a relatively equal footing, a fiduci74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

249.
312.
272-74.
292-93.
293.
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ary analysis can better respond to the gravamen of the wrong
where there is an imbalance of power between the parties.
It remains to be seen how far and in what directions the
Supreme Court will extend its initial applications of fiduciary
law or its sensitivity to what La Forest, J., termed the "powerdependency" relation in future analyses of the doctor-patient relationship and the concomitant rights and duties that arise. The
majority of the Court in Norberg was hesitant or unwilling to go
beyond the interest in protecting and accessing confidential information that the Court identified in McInerney. Even
McLachlin, J., noted that the scope of physicians' fiduciary obligations would have to be determined on a case-by-case basis,
"having reference to the degree of power imbalance and patient
vulnerability" in each relationship. 79 Further, the abuse of
power in Norberg was both egregious and different in kind from
that normally addressed in malpractice cases. Beyond imposing
a "trust" with respect to patient records, it is unclear whether
abuse will be a sine qua non of the extension of fiduciary obligations in this area.
Norberg offers a new model of the patient as a vulnerable,
dependent party in an inherently unequal relationship.80 How
this will be reconciled with the model of individual autonomy
and free will that forms the basis of the law requiring a patient's
informed consent to medical treatment is unclear. Some critics
of the doctrine of informed consent have argued that the model
of individual autonomy and free will is fundamentally flawed because it is premised on the assumption that the patient is a rational, independent choice-maker giving a voluntary consent to
treatment. 8 1 It is said that despite the great normative commitment to the model of separate selves evident in both law and
modern medicine, the boundaries of self are not so impermeable
as is assumed, particularly where an ill, frightened patient is concerned. Consequently, critics argue the autonomy model enables decision-makers (be they doctors or judges) to abdicate
their responsibility to the patient. The autonomy model itself
incorporates something of that awareness, as it is in part meant
79. Id. at 287.
80. As La Forest, J., noted in Norberg, "[a]n unequal distribution of power is frequently a part of the doctor-patient relationship." Id. at 258. See id. at 247 (La Forest, J., commented on the concept of consent in tort law operating on a presumption
of autonomy and free will).
81. See, e.g., ROBERT A. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF
LAW IN DOCrOR-PATIENT RELATIONS 117-18, 136 (1979).
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to correct existing inequalities in power and to shore up the patient's position. However, we must question how well we are
served by having just one model, a model that is a useful ideal
but is not always consonant with reality.
In contrast to the uncritical acceptance of a patient's consent
to or refusal of treatment evident in negligence and battery
cases, 82 the opinions of La Forest and McLachlin, JJ., in Norberg
are sensitive to the manifold meanings of and motivations for a
patient's consent (albeit not to treatment in that case), and both
held that the reasons for the patient's consent are legally relevant. In that case, the reasons vitiated the consent's legal effect.
It remains to be seen whether this different perception of the
nature of the doctor-patient relationship will be taken beyond
that very specific context and applied to the more traditional
type of malpractice case.
If the fiduciary or "power-dependency" nature of the physician-patient relationship does play a part in the analysis of the
traditional malpractice case, then findings with respect to liability may be affected. For example, as McLachlin, J., pointed out
in Norberg, defences based on the contributory negligence of
the plaintiff may carry little weight, foreseeability of loss would
not be a factor in determining damages, and there may be a
more generous approach to remedies overall. 83 In addition, limitation periods may be longer or nonexistent. 84 Indeed, fiduciary analysis has the potential to expand the types of
circumstances that would support a finding of liability and increase the amounts that plaintiffs could recover. This, taken together with the strength of current commitments to the model of
patient self-determination and autonomy, make it likely that
courts will maintain a conservative approach to the application
of fiduciary analysis in traditional malpractice cases.
IV.

CAUSATION

Plaintiffs in complex scientific or medical cases often have a
difficult time meeting the traditional standard of proof for causation. The evidence of the experts may conflict and there may
82. See, e.g., Malette v. Shulman, 67 D.L.R. 4th 321 (Ont. C.A. 1990) (patient's
signed card refusing blood transfusions must carry over to prevail in a later period of
incompetence, even where the treatment would be life-saving).
83. [1992] 2 S.C.R. 224, 290.
84. See, e.g., Limitations Act, R.S.O., ch. L.1-15 (1990); M.(K) v. M.(H), 3 S.C.R.
6, 24 (1992) (per La Forest, J.).
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be nothing to choose between them, available scientific or statistical evidence may not meet the balance of probabilities standard employed in civil cases, or, particularly in a product
liability case, the product may have been so widely manufactured and marketed that liability cannot be traced to any one
defendant.

Faced with these dilemmas, Canadian courts have not widened the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, assessed
fault on the basis of market share liability, or adopted the other

creative (or perhaps just pragmatic) approaches that American
courts have developed.85 With regard to res ipsa loquitur, in
most medical cases Canadian courts have held that the plaintiff's claim cannot be sustained for one of three reasons: the

cause of the injury is unknown, the injury could have occurred
without negligence, or the defendant has proffered an8 6explanation consistent with there having been no negligence.

There has, however, been some doctrinal response in Canada
to the problem of proving causation. Initially, some lower
courts, taking a leaf from the 1973 decision of the House of
Lords in McGhee v. National Coal Board,87 held that the burden

of proof should shift to the party that created the risk of injury.88
However, in Snell v. Farrell,a 1990 decision, the Supreme Court
of Canada confirmed that the burden of proving causation in
tort cases still lay with the plaintiff because adopting an alterna-

tive would have the "effect of compensating plaintiffs where a
substantial connection between the injury and defendant's conduct is absent." 89 The Court noted that both the burden and
standard of proof are flexible concepts, and that it had shifted

85. Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311, 320-322 (per Sopinka, J.); see, e.g., Terrie
A. Rymer, The DiethylstilbestrolDilemma, 251 JAMA 3228 (1984).
86. Snell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. at 322; Hollis v. Birch, 81 B.C.L.J.2d 1, 12-14 (C.A.
1993). For an explanation of the American development and use of res ipsa loquitur
in medical malpractice cases, see WEILER, supra note 50, at 22-23.
87. [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1 (H.L.). In that case, it could not be established whether the
worker's dermatitis was the result of his employer's negligent failure to provide showers after work or of the working conditions themselves (with respect to which the
employer was not negligent). The House of Lords held that it was sufficient that the
employer had negligently created a risk of dermatitis and that the condition in fact
materialized. The suggestion that this represented a shift in the burden of proof was
disavowed by the House of Lords itself fifteen years later in Wilshire v. Essex Area
Health Auth., [1988] 2 W.L.R. 557 (H.L.). Rather, the House of Lords in Wilshire
characterized McGhee merely as taking a "robust and pragmatic approach to the
facts." Id. at 569.
88. For Canadian cases following McGhee, see those cited in Snell, [1990] 2 S.C.R.
at 325-26.
89. Id. at 327.

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol3/iss1/14

20

1994]

Gilmour: Overview of Medical Malpractice Law in Canada

Canadian Medical Malpractice

both in other contexts where the underlying rationales were inapplicable in the circumstances. 90 Sopinka, J., writing for the
Court, was as good as his word and proceeded to flex both the
standard and the burden of proof in Snell, although without expressly shifting either.
The Snell case arose as a result of the negligence of an ophthalmologist who continued plaintiff's cataract surgery in the
face of retrobulbar bleeding. The plaintiff suffered atrophy of
the optic nerve, which was most likely the result of a stroke in
the eye attributable either to the defendant's negligence or some
other, unrelated cause. The Court faced the issues of who
should bear the burden of proof and how that burden could be
discharged given the proclivity of medical experts to express
outcomes in terms of percentages (often less than fifty percent)
and their inability in some cases to form an opinion that one
cause was more likely than another. In Snell, while the plaintiff
could prove the physician's negligence and a loss suffered within
the scope of the risk created by the surgery, she could not prove
that the negligence definitely caused her loss.
In the view of Sopinka, J., much of the dissatisfaction with the
traditional approach to causation stems from courts applying it
too rigidly; legal causation is quite distinct from notions of scientific causation, and though the former can be guided by the latter, it need not be rigidly constrained by it.91 In practical terms,
in order to establish legal causation, a plaintiff does not necessarily have to be able to present medical evidence establishing
negligence as the probable cause of the injury with a certainty of
fifty-one percent or greater. Indeed, particularly where the facts
lie peculiarly within the defendant's knowledge, as they do in
many medical malpractice cases, and where, as here, the defendant's negligence in continuing the operation despite the apparent bleeding made it impossible for the plaintiff or anyone else
to detect the bleeding alleged to have caused the injury, then
"very little affirmative evidence" is needed by the plaintiff to
justify the trier of fact in drawing an "inference of causation" in
the absence of evidence to the contrary. 92 Further, even if the
defendant does adduce some evidence that he or she was not
negligent or that the plaintiff's injury is attributable to some
90. Id. at 321, 328.
91. Id. at 328. See also Laferrire v. Lawson, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 541, 606-607 (per
Gonthier, J.).
92. [1990] 2 S.C.R. at 328-29.
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other cause, that will not necessarily be fatal to the plaintiff's
case, since "all evidence is to be weighed according to the proof
which it was in the power of one side to have produced, and in
the power of the other to have contradicted. ' 93 In effect, the
defendant's negligence was counted against him not only per se,
but also for having made it impossible for the plaintiff to prove
the link between the negligence and her injury.
While the Court's conclusion that the law demands less certainty than medicine (at least with respect to causation) assisted
the plaintiff in Snell,94 unfortunately, the law as laid down seems
to have left a great many uncertainties. How is a plaintiff to
prove causation if the expert evidence is conflicting or not definitive, and with what degree of certainty? How can a defendant
respond effectively? And what answer is there to Lord Wilberforce's criticism in McGhee v. National Coal Board, where he
questions a court's ability to make legitimate inferences of
fact-to "bridge the evidential gap"-when medical experts are
not able to do so? 95 The distinction between Snell's prescription
for dealing with the issue of causation and a reversal of the burden of proof is not at all clear.
That distinction was obscured even further after the Supreme
Court of Canada's decision in Laferri~re v. Lawson.96 In 1971,
the defendant doctor recommended removal of an abnormal
mass from the breast of his patient, Mrs. Dupuis. The pathology
report confirmed the presence of breast cancer. The defendant
never told his patient of the cancer diagnosis nor did he discuss
postoperative treatment or long-term follow-up. After a few
years, Mrs. Dupuis fell ill again, and in 1975, she was diagnosed
with generalized cancer. She died in 1978.
93. Id. at 328 (quoting Lord Mansfield in Blatch v. Archer, 1 Cowp. 63, 98 E.R.
969, 970 (1774)).
94. Id. at 330. For a decision following Snell, see Rehak v. McLennan, 1992 O.J.
No. 1398 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) (plaintiff recovered against radiologist for missed diagnosis of dislocated shoulder joint complicating a diagnosed fracture, which delayed
proper treatment, even though expert evidence as to whether plaintiff would have
suffered the same extent of permanent disability if promptly treated was conflicting).
95. Snell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. at 323 (quoting McGhee).
96. [1991] 1 S.C.R. 541. The decision also provides a recent example of the application of the "respectable minority" principle in practice, as the Court held that the
procedure the doctor employed-removal of the malignant tumour from the plaintiff's breast with no additional treatment by irradiation or chemotherapy-was recognized at the time, although not the standard treatment. Further, expert evidence
established that at the time (1971), there was no difference in the survival rates of
those who just had the lump removed and those who had the more common radical
mastectomy followed by radiation and chemotherapy.
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Mrs. Dupuis' estate continued the action she had commenced
against the physician who removed the mass. At trial, the court
held that her doctor was negligent in failing to inform his patient
that she had cancer and in failing to recommend that her condition be monitored. Given that there was only a slim possibility
(not probability) that her chances of survival would have been
greater had she received aggressive treatment in a timely fashion, the court had to determine whether a patient could recover
damages for the "loss of a chance." In other words, could the
physician be found liable for negligently depriving his patient of
an opportunity to recover from an illness, even if that opportunity would only have been possible and not probable absent the
doctor's fault?
Carrying forward the practice of drawing inferences from less
than compelling facts that it began to develop in Snell, the majority in Laferriere noted that in cases where a physician's negligence presents "a clear danger for the health and security of the
patient and where such a danger materializes, it may be reasonable for a judge to assume the causal link between the negligence and the damage" unless there is evidence or a strong
indication to the contrary.97 This standard sounds remarkably
like imposing liability for injury that falls within the scope of the
risk created by the defendant, the approach taken in McGhee
and rejected, at least overtly, in Snell. However, the Court in
Laferriere nonetheless considered that it was adhering to traditional principles of causation.98
Whether or not the majority's statements signal a sub rosa
shifting of the burden of proof, they did not avail the plaintiff in
Laferriere. Gonthier, J., writing for the majority of six, held that
the "loss of chance" theory should not be accepted in medical
liability cases to support claims for damages for physical pain,
suffering, and premature death. 99 As the plaintiff could not establish that the deceased would have lived longer or been cured
if she had received earlier or different treatment, applying such
a theory would undermine the traditional requirement that
97. Id. at 608.
98. Id. at 608-09.
99. Id. at 605-06, 608. The decision was made with respect to the civil law of
Quebec. One can, however, expect a similar analysis at common law. See Salvatore
Mirandola, Lost Chances, Cause-in-Factand Rationality in Medical Negligence, 50 U.
TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 258, 273 (1992). For a suggestion to the contrary, see
Nicholas Rafferty, Developments in Contract and Tort Law: The 1990-1991 Term, 3
Sup. CT. L. REV. 2D

73, 111-17 (1992).
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plaintiffs prove a causal link between the negligence and the injury, here death, on a balance of probabilities. 1°° The inference
the Court drew was that death was almost certainly inevitable
whether or not the patient received treatment; hence, the plaintiff could not show the defendant's negligence was the cause of
Mrs. Dupuis' death. The Court did, however, hold that the physician was liable for other, lesser injuries that the patient suffered: specifically, that earlier treatment might have afforded
her a better quality of life and that she suffered psychologically
from the defendant's failure to inform. 1 1 In the end, the Court
reduced the damages awarded her estate from $50,000 (Can.) to
$17,500 (Can.).
As a number of commentators have pointed out, a decision
such as Laferriredoes not accord with the notions of fairness or
the deterrent value underlying tort law. If a patient was not
likely to survive in any event, a negligent physician may escape
liability even if his or her negligence led to the patient's death
when the plaintiff cannot establish the necessary causal link with
greater certainty than is often possible in such situations. 02
Although other types of lost chances, such as economic lost
chance, are clearly recognized as compensable, courts will not
compensate a plaintiff for a lost chance to recover his or her
health, at least if the chance is small. On the other hand, the
"loss of chance" theory could make the physician, or more accurately the C.M.P.A., a no-fault insurer, compensating patients
for any injury whether or not causally connected to the physician's mistake.
CONCLUSION

It is apparent from this review of recent developments that
the Canadian system for compensating patients injured by medical malpractice is slow, complex, and by no means certain-a
patient who has suffered iatrogenic injury from substandard care
may not be compensated for that injury even if he or she does
commence a lawsuit. Although the number of actions alleging
medical malpractice commenced and paid and the size of the
average settlement have all increased rapidly in Canada, it is estimated that Canada's current compensation system still results
100.
101.
102.
70 CAN.

[1991] 1 S.C.R. at 610.
Id. at 610-11.
See, e.g., John G. Fleming, ProbabilisticCausationin Tort Law: A Postscript,
B. REV. 136, 137 (1991); Mirandola, supra note 99.
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in financial support for fewer than one in ten victims of avoidable medical injuries. °3 Similar conclusions have been reached
by recent studies in the United States, such as the Harvard Med14
ical Practice Study commissioned by the state of New York. '
The "malpractice crisis," then, is two-way: not only are claims
and costs increasing dramatically, but the majority of victims of
medical malpractice remain uncompensated.
That being the case, it is no wonder that there are calls for
reform of the legal system applicable to medical liability claims.
Not surprisingly, pressure to reform the system comes from both
health care providers and recipients, resulting in suggested reforms that vary widely in substance and thrust. On the one side
are proposals to limit the scope of claims and the time within
which plaintiffs can assert them; on the other are proposals to
widen both scope and time and to remove the requirement of
proving fault.
Recently, a comprehensive study conducted for the federal
and provincial Ministers of Health by the Federal/Provincial/
Territorial Review on Liability and Compensation Issues in
Health Care (the Prichard Report) made a proposal to maintain
and reform present tort actions, widen the responsibility of
health care institutions, and, most significantly, develop a nofault compensation system as an alternative for persons suffering significant, avoidable medical injuries. 5 To date, this proposal has not been adopted.
In the three years between the commissioning of the Prichard
Report in 1987 and its completion in 1990, the perception of a
malpractice crisis in Canada faded somewhat, despite continually increasing claims and costs.1° 6 It is likely that the malpractice crisis has been eclipsed for now by newly pressing concerns
about the need to contain rising health care costs.
103. PRICHARD REPORT, supra note 10, app. A at 102. It must be recognized that
this figure is an extrapolation drawn from experience in other countries, for as it
points out, "[nione of the systemic evidence on the extent of patient injury is Canadian." Id. at 101. As such, it suffers from the weaknesses of that type of exercise.
The severity of the medical injuries included is also unclear.
104. Charlotte Gray, Canadian Lawyer at Harvard a Mainstay Behind Calls to
Change Response to Medical Malpractice,149 CAN. MED. Assoc. J. 477, (1993). See
also WEILER, supra note 50, at 134; PAUL C. WEILER ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSA-

TION

(1993).

105.
106.

PRICHARD REPORT, note

10, app. A at 179-357.

Gray, supra note 104.
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Like all eclipses, though, this one will only be temporary.
Claims, C.M.P.A. dues, and amounts paid to patients will continue to increase. Many of those who have been injured by physician fault will continue to go uncompensated, as will many
more who were injured in the course of treatment but without
fault on the part of anyone. If this pattern continues unimpeded, which is likely given the attention now focused on other
areas in the health care system, then the malpractice crisis in
Canada will break out again, only in more severe form. That
much seems inevitable.
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